It\u27s the Budget, Stupid: A Policy Analysis of Clinton\u27s First Budget by Fendrich, James Max et al.
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 
Volume 21 
Issue 4 December Article 2 
December 1994 
It's the Budget, Stupid: A Policy Analysis of Clinton's First Budget 
James Max Fendrich 
Florida State University 
Jamie Miller 
Florida State University 
Tim Nickel 
Florida State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw 
 Part of the Public Policy Commons, and the Social Work Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fendrich, James Max; Miller, Jamie; and Nickel, Tim (1994) "It's the Budget, Stupid: A Policy Analysis of 
Clinton's First Budget," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 21 : Iss. 4 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol21/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan 
University School of Social Work. For more information, 
please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu. 
It's The Budget, Stupid: A Policy






This paper analyzes President Clinton's first budget. Clinton's budget
is his public policy. The budget is compared to Clinton's three stated
objectives of stimulating the economy, investing in the future and re-
ducing the deficit. His proposed budget and subsequent modifications are
also compared to the budgets of previous administrations. In contrast to
Reagan's first budget, which was a radical modification of public policy,
Clinton's budget is only an incremental change from the public policies
of the Reagan/Bush years.
This paper has two main objectives. The initial budget of
a new administration sets the parameters of what can be ac-
complished during the term and sets the tone for subsequent
policy development. We examine President Clinton's budget
to ascertain if his policies indicate a major new direction in
U. S. public policy. Second, we assess what impact, if any, Clin-
ton's budget will have on improving the economy, overcoming
Reaganomics, and redistributing economic benefits and taxes in
a more equitable fashion.
Sociologists tend to consider federal budgetary decisions as
unrelated to basic interests and concerns (Padgett, 1981). Yet,
there is both longstanding (Goldscheid, 1917; Schumpeter, 1991
[1918]; O'Connor, 1973; Bell, 1976) and contemporary interest in
fiscal sociology. Joseph Schumpeter (1991 [19181: 100-101) may
have said it best:
The fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of
its general history. An enormous influence on the fate of nations
emanates from the economic bleeding which the needs of the state
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necessitate, and from the use to which its results are put... But
even greater than the causal is the symptomatic significance of fiscal
history. The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure,
the deeds its policy may prepare-all this and more is written in
its fiscal history, stripped of all phrases. He who knows how to
listen to its message, here discerns the thunder of world history
more clearly than anywhere else.
Fiscal sociology is the art and science of discovering the prin-
ciples governing the volume and allocation of state finances
and expenditures, and the distribution of the tax burden and
benefits among various economic classes. Government spending
accounts for about one third of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and the federal budget is by far the biggest compo-
nent of government spending. Far from being a sterile or arid
enterprise, the fiscal sociology of budgetary analysis can be
extremely useful in understanding the direction and character-
istics of the political economy of the modern welfare state. This
is particularly true when the economy and electoral patterns are
undergoing dynamic shifts.
When Presidents Carter's last and Reagan's first budgets
were analyzed in an earlier study (Fendrich and St. Angelo,
1981), a number of important conclusions and accurate short-
term predictions about the consequences of policy shifts were
made. This occured before a critical consensus emerged over
the harmful consequences of Reaganomics (Phillips, 1990; Har-
rison and Bluestone, 1988). President Reagan defined and ex-
panded his mandate, and used it effectively during his first
200 days in office to gain both Democratic and Republican
support for his Economic Recovery Act. In comparing Reagan's
1982 budget to Carter's, spending outlays for almost all bud-
getary functions received substantial cuts-regulatory agencies
and social programs were particularly hard hit (Fendrich and
St. Angelo, 1981).
The most dramatic changes in the Reagan budget were in
the area of taxes. Reagan's public policy altered the tax code
to rapidly redistribute wealth upward. Congress slashed taxes
$749 billion. These cuts largely benefited the wealthy and/or
corporate American, while the average citizen had her or his tax
cut offset by increasing Social Security taxes. Although Reagan's
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politically conservative rhetoric hyped the popular ideas of re-
ducing the size and functions of government, the real political
agenda was to use government authority and power to assist
corporations and wealthy individuals. The tax cuts, deregu-
latory activities, and projected increases in defense spending
clearly signified that class segments of the economic elite were
using government policies to solve their problems and serve
their interests. In 1988, the Congressional Budget Office reported
that the bottom 80-percent of families in the United States lost
income between the years 1977 to 1988. On the other hand, the
top five percent of families experienced an income increase of
23.4-percent, and the top one percent of families experienced
an income increase of 49.8-percent-in real dollar terms their
incomes rose from $270,053 to $404,566 (Phillips, 1990). The
budget figures demonstrated that the liberal spirit and thrust
of "New Deal" and "Great Society" legislation was over.
Clinton's Budget
The Democratic victory in the 1992 presidential election pro-
vided an opportunity to reverse the public policy of the Reagan/
Bush era. As The New York Times reported on the day after the
election, "something approaching two-thirds of the electorate
said it wanted to put an end to business as usual" (Apple,
1992:B3); in other words, there was a "mandate for change".
While an impressive amount (19-percent) of this pro-change
vote went the Independent candidate Ross Perot, the majority
of it went to Clinton. Throughout Clinton's campaign, three
themes of change surfaced: 1) restore the American economy
through both private investment incentives and public invest-
ment; 2) restore fairness through a more equitable tax code and
various transfer payments-in other words, make those who
can afford it pay more while protecting those in need; and
3) reduce the deficit through a combination of spending cuts,
expanded user fees for both businesses and consumers, and tax
increases. In his first budgetary message to Congress, titled A
Vision of Change for America, President Clinton (1993) roundly
criticized the upward flow of wealth which occurred under
Reaganomics, and promised to restore fairness by redistributing
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benefits and opportunities. Was his message a real promise, a
faint hope, or only political rhetoric?
Restoring the Economy
Clinton's plan to get the economy back on its feet consisted
of a stimulus package for immediate growth and investment
proposals to foster long term growth. Both sides of this ap-
proach consisted of selective spending and tax incentives. The
goal of the economic Stimulus Package was to give the econ-
omy a jump start by providing immediate public investment,
decreasing unemployment, increasing private incentives. To ac-
complish these goals, Clinton initially proposed a $16.3 billion
Stimulus Package (Vision of Change). Of this amount, $8.3 billion
would actually be spent in 1993 with the remainder earmarked
for future years. In Clinton's first official budget proposal (re-
ferred to as the April budget), stimulus spending for the late 90's
was increased; however, spending for 1993 and 1994 remained
virtually unchanged. Furthermore, nearly $6.5 billion in tax
incentives-particularly an Investment Tax Credit-were pro-
posed. This plan met many of Clinton's campaign promises-
such as putting 100,000 new police officers on the streets, ex-
tending unemployment compensation, increasing spending on
transportation, accelerating the HOME Investment Partnerships
program, providing funds for environmental cleanup, and pro-
viding tax credits for small business investment. The Stimulus
Package also signalled that other campaign promises might well
be fulfilled in the future-such as a fully-funded Head Start;
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); Immunization; Technol-
ogy investments; and other programs. Overall, it appeared to
represent an early attempt on Clinton's part to transform pub-
lic policy.
However, the inability of Clinton and the Senate Democrats
to break a Republican filibuster led to the death of the Stimulus
Package. Only the $4 billion extension of unemployment bene-
fits was passed. Later attempts at passing a scaled-down version
of the package also failed, until supplemental appropriations-
which contained remnants of the Stimulus bill-were passed
by both Houses. This supplemental included $220 million for
summer jobs (originally $1 billion in Vision of Change), $341
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million in financial aid for students (originally over $2 billion),
$150 million for more Law Enforcement, and $175 million for a
Small Business Administration loan program (originally a $3.3
billion). All of these were a far cry from the original $16.3 billion
package.
Building upon the Stimulus Package, the Investment
Proposals were intended to continue the economic recovery
and guarantee a growing and productive economy through
increased public and private investment. These investment pro-
posals constitute the key campaign promises made by Clinton
to restore the economy. But what, or how much, constitutes
the fulfillment of a promise? Is any spending increase enough
to fulfill a campaign promise? Given Clinton's "mandate for
change", it would be inappropriate to consider minor incre-
mental changes as evidence of a fulfilled promise. Although
the theory of incremental budgeting and policy making has
been widely criticized (Axelrod, 1988; Schullman, 1975), it is
still useful to examine the budget to determine whether the
Clinton adminstration was proposing only incremental changes
or whether his budget represented significant policy shifts.
Following conventional incremental budgetary analysis, we
have decided that a nonincremental increase of greater than
5-percent beyond Bush's 1992 budget (which provides the base-
line) constitutes a serious policy change. In making these com-
parisons, it is necessary to account for inflation from one fiscal
year to the next. While the Consumer Price Index is commonly
used to account for inflation, we have decided to use the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) deflator as a more conservative esti-
mate. According to Clinton's budget, the GDP deflator is
2.8-percent for 1993. Thus, accounting for inflation, a nonincre-
mental change is defined as greater than a 7.8-percent increase
over Bush's budget.
Given that the 1993 budget only represents adjustments to
Bush's already existing budget policy, it would be unfair to
judge Clinton solely on this criteria. The FY1994 budget pro-
posals represent Clinton's first "real" budget. So in addition,
Clinton's FY1994 proposals will be compared to the FY1993
adjustments to see if his promises are introduced, retained,
or dropped in this subsequent year. If a 1993 budget figure
10 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
already represents a significant (i.e. nonincremental) departure
from the FY1992 budget figure, then we can expect that figure
to stay relatively level through FY1994. To accurately identify
a constant level of spending between budgets, we must again
account for inflation, which is estimated to be 2.9-percent (the
1994 GDP deflator estimate). For spending in any given budget
category to have remained steady, spending must increase by
at least 2.9-percent between FY1993 and FY1994. On the other
hand, spending must increase by 7.9-percent between the FY93
and FY94 budgets for us to identify a significant change.
With this guideline, it is clear that there were no substantial
changes in public investment policy. Only a few of the pro-
grams slated for investment increases represented nonincremen-
tal shifts. Such shifts took place in spending for Community
Block Grants (an increase in spending of 23.3-percent between
1992 and 1993, and up 30.8-percent between 1993 and 1994), En-
vironmental Clean-Up (up 20.5-percent in 1993 and 10.4-percent
in 1994), and WIC (up 14.2-percent in 1993 and 12.4-percent in
1994). Other programs received only "symbolic" support, i.e.
they were provided with increased spending in nonincremental
terms, but, in real dollar terms, received rather small increases
of under half a billion dollars. The establishment of Community
Development Banks and the National Service Initiative, and
funding for the HOME program and Energy Conservation fell
within this category of symbolic increases. Other "symbolic"
programs were those in which spending increased in 1993, but
then dropped again in 1994. The increased funding promised
for job training programs suffered this fallback; funding for
these programs in FY1994 will fall below the FY1993 levels.
Most of these programs were underfunded because the Stim-
ulus Package was not approved by Congress. In more general
terms, Clinton promised to invest $20 billion a year to rebuild
America's infrastructure. But as President, he only proposed
$34.7 and $35.8 billion in outlays over four years (in Vision of
Change and the April Budget respectively), less than half the
amount promised.
One of the real opportunities for shifting public investment
policy was provided by the end of the Cold War. Shifting from
"military Keynesianism" and the centrality of the defense indus-
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try to an economy centered around non-defense public spend-
ing was a key component of Clinton's proposals for "Defense
Conversion". While it is true that funding was proposed in this
area (a total of $19.5 billion over the next five years), it fell
well short of the $60 billion Clinton promised as a candidate.
Indicative of this, Clinton failed to shift federal funding on
research and development from defense to non-defense pro-
grams. In both his FY1993 adjustments and his FY1994 budget
the percentage of total federal funding for non-defense research
remained virtually unchanged (increasing from 41-percent to 42-
percent). The total federal spending proposed for research and
development represented only an incremental increase, rather
than the significant increase promised. Public investment policy
remains oriented towards the defense industry.
Furthermore, Clinton massively scaled back many of his
Investment Proposals following the April budget. Clinton only
asked Congress for an additional $16.7 billion in budget au-
thority for investment proposals which would result in only
$5.9 billion in FY1994 outlays. This was $2 billion less than the
authority initially planned in the April Budget. Of this, House
appropriators only provided $8.8 billion in authority (excluding
defense) or about 53-percent of what was requested (CQ Weekly
Report, 1993e:1717).
According to Vision of Change and carried forward in Clin-
ton's April budget, most of these investment proposals were
back-loaded, i.e. full-funding was withheld until some future
date. Slated to receive full-funding in the latter part of Clin-
ton's term, these programs receive anywhere from two to ten
times as much funding in 1997 than they did in 1994. For
example, Clinton proposed to fully fund Head Start, but this
will not occur until 1999, and 38-percent of funding for WIC
is scheduled for after 1997. Over one-third (40.4-percent) of the
total investment proposal spending occurs in 1997. At this time,
Clinton's figures show the deficit beginning to rise again. Thus,
when Clinton's investment programs are scheduled to receive
full-funding, "the president and Congress would.., face the
difficult choice of fully funding his initiatives or holding down
increases in the deficit" (Judis, 1993b:16). This back-loading of
programs, combined with Congress' reluctance to provide even
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half of what Clinton originally proposed, makes it unlikely that
any of these investment proposals will receive full-funding in
the future, much less meet Clinton's campaign promises for
public investment.
The second part of Clinton's investment plan consisted of
private incentives through tax breaks. Unlike the failure to
change public investment policy, Clinton had some success
in implementing his private incentive policy. Table 1 provides
Clinton's key campaign promises in the area of private incen-
tives. Clinton's proposals reflected his promises for a Small Busi-
ness Investment Tax Credit and a Research and Experimentation
Tax Credit. But for the other promises listed, Clinton provided
only symbolic fulfillment. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
and the Enterprise Zone credit are both small programs com-
posed of little more than a quarter billion dollars combined in
FY1994. Backing away from his innovative proposal to require
corporations to pay for continuing education and training, Clin-
ton instead proposed to provide corporations with a tax break,
however small, for these activities.
Clinton's non-incremental private incentive proposals, did
not make it through Congress unscathed. The budget proposal
presented by the Joint Conference Committee revealed numer-
ous changes to the April budget. They eliminated the Small
Business Investment Tax credit proposed by Clinton, and the
expansion of the Research and Experimentation credit was lim-
ited to only about 6 months. Both of the private investment
promises fulfilled by Clinton were cut by the Committee, while
other, more symbolic, proposals were only slightly altered.
Restoring Fairness
Taxation was one of the most important issues of the 1992
campaign. Candidate Clinton spoke countless times of restoring
fairness to the tax code, with an eye towards relieving some
of the tax burden of the middle and working classes. Early in
the campaign, Clinton promised to reduce payroll taxes, which
would have given a tax cut or credit of $300-$350 a year for fami-
lies with adjusted gross incomes of less than $80,000 (equivalent
to $60,000 taxable income). He also advocated an Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC), which would have amounted to $22.5 billion
Budget Analysis
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in tax relief over four years. Later, as the issue of the deficit took
center stage, Clinton revised his plan; families could take either
a reduction in payroll taxes OR a credit for children, but not
both. Finally, as the election neared and the projected deficit
figure continued to grow, Clinton further distanced himself
from the middle class tax cuts by focusing on the size of the
deficit and the uncertainty of the future. In a Presidential Debate
on October 19, he hedged on the tax issue, saying, "You can't
say 'read my lips' because you can't know what emergencies
might come up" (CQ Weekly Report, 1993a:386). But barring any
emergencies, Clinton promised that he would not raise taxes on
the middle (or working) class.
As President, Clinton scaled back the EITC request to $19.8
billion over four years. The House reintroduced a more gener-
ous tax credit, proposing to increase funding by $28.2 billion
over five years in what was an $11 billion per year program.
Under this provision, low-income families with two or more
children would have received up to $2,685 in 1994, and $3,371
thereafter. Low-income individuals with no children would
have received up to $306. However, the Senate cut this pro-
gram considerably, proposing $10 billion less. Under this pro-
vision, the EITC would have gradually increased to $3,315 in
1996 for families with two or more children. The Senate made
no provision for individuals with no children (CQ Weekly Re-
port, 1993d:1637; NYT, 1993g:A1). The administration and some
House members had vowed to restore the EITC cutbacks be-
cause the credit was "a crucial component of Clinton's larger
goal of expanding incentives for the poor to avoid welfare" (CQ
Weekly Report, 1993d:1637). However, the Joint Conference Com-
mittee did not restore all that much; their compromise expanded
the EITC by $20.8 billion over five years, although individuals
without children are eligible (Wall Street Journal, 1993:A9). Even
if Clinton's proposal had made it into the budget intact, it would
still have "stop[ped] short of the campaign pledge he made
that all families with a full-time worker be guaranteed enough
money to live above the poverty line" (Verhovek, 1993:A1).
As another promise to restore fairness, Clinton opposed a
gas tax as being unfair to middle class taxpayers. As President,
he proposed an alternative broad energy tax based on the BTU
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content of different fuels. Different kinds of fuel could be taxed
differently, or not taxed at all (as with solar and other renewable
energy sources, and oil used to make plastics, chemicals, and
tires) (NYT, 1993a:3). The plan would have brought in nearly $72
billion in revenues over five years, and would raise the average
family's annual combined bills for gasoline, home heat, and
electricity by only $100-$150. Lobbyists from a wide variety of
industries began working to kill Clinton's energy tax before he
was even officially the President (NYT, 1993d:A1). The House,
which voted on their version of the budget in late May, retained
the $72 billion, broad-based BTU tax in a show of support for
the President. However, by the second week in June,
... after the proposed tax on coal was lowered; after aluminum
smelters and barge operators got a break; after farmers and city
dwellers won exemptions for the diesel that heats homes and
runs turbines; after oil refiners and gas and electric companies
moved the tax off their backs and onto consumers'; after grain
merchants won and then lost a battle to exempt ethanol; after
chemical and glass makers secured protection against untaxed
foreign competitors... after all that and more, the White House
gave up on enacting a tax on the heat content of fuels.. . (Wines,
1993a:A1).
This energy tax would have provided the essential revenue
needed to fund the variety of social programs supported by
the House (EITC, empowerment zones, etc.). Both the House
and Senate supported Clinton's proposal to extend the 2.5 cent
increase in the gas tax through September 30, 1999. But con-
servative Democrats and moderates in the Senate forced the
drop of the BTU tax, and substituted for it a 4.3 cent increase
in the tax on gasoline and other transportation fuels. This plan
would only bring in about $24.2 billion in revenues over the
next five years. The final resolution of the energy tax debate in
the Joint Conference Committee upheld the modest 4.3 cent gas
tax proposed by the Senate (WSJ, 1993:A9).
Candidate Clinton also promised to make the wealthy and
large corporations pay their "fair share" of taxes. For the
wealthy, he proposed to raise the top income tax rate from
31-percent to 36-percent, which would apply to gross adjusted
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incomes above $200,000 for couples filing jointly, and $150,000
for single filers. As President, he changed the lower end of
the bracket for which this tax would apply to include adjusted
gross incomes in excess of $180,000 for joint filers and $140,000
for single filers (CQ Weekly Report, 1993a:385). These figures
correspond to $140,000 and $115,000 in taxable income, respec-
tively. Furthermore, candidate Clinton sought to impose a 10-
percent "millionaire's surtax" on taxable income in excess of
$1 million (excluding capital gains), creating an effective top
rate of 39.6-percent for those affected. As President, Clinton
was forced to revise this proposal downward, such that taxable
incomes greater than $250,000 would be subject to the 10-percent
surtax. Conflict between the House and Senate on these issues
arose over when the new tax should be implemented, what
the top capital gains tax rate should be, and whether capital
gains should be subject to the 10% surtax (CQ Weekly Report,
1993b:1280; 1993d:1637). After negotiating these differences, the
Joint Conference Committee decided to uphold the House posi-
tion that the new tax rate be retroactive to January 1, 1993, and
deleted the 10-percent surtax on capital gains suggested by the
Senate (NYT, 1993h:A10).
As President, Clinton initially proposed to increase the top
tax rate on corporations from 34-percent to 36-percent on taxable
income and net capital gains in excess of $10 million. How-
ever, both the House and Senate voted to limit that increase to
35-percent. In the Joint Conference Committee, Representative
Charles Rangel and others advocated Clinton's initial proposal
to raise the top corporate tax rate to 36-percent to help pay
for social programs; however, in a clear turn around, Clinton
opposed it (NYT, 1993f:A14). Clinton also promised to cap cor-
porate deductions for CEO salaries at $1 million, and totally
eliminate deductions for lobbying expenses. Again the House
and Senate were agreeable to Clinton's proposals, but they de-
termined that something loosely defined as "performance-based
compensation" would be exempt from the cap (CQ Weekly Re-
port, 1993b:1280; 1993c:1546). As many executive pay packages
are tied to some measure of company performance, this exemp-
tion provides a considerable loophole for corporations (NYT,
1993a:3).
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In another bid to restore fairness, Clinton proposed to com-
pletely eliminate tax deductions for business-related meals and
entertainment. These used to be 100-percent deductible, until
Congress, in 1986, scaled it back to 80-percent, calling the tax
break "a write-off for rich businessmen who dined at overpriced
restaurants" (Wines, 1993b:A8). But instead of completely elim-
inating the deductible in 1993, the House and Senate reduced it
to 50-percent (CQ Weekly Report, 1993b:1280; 1993c:1546). Then,
after a skillful lobbying campaign by the restaurant industry,
members of Congress were "seriously considering restoring a
chunk of the deduction, at a cost of perhaps $7 billion in lost
revenues, even as they haggle over the size of tax increases and
cuts in social programs" (Wines, 1993b:A8). However, the Joint
Conference Committee concluded that such an action would
indeed be too costly, and opted instead to add a credit for
restauranteurs. This compromise convinced another Democratic
senator, Richard Bryan of Nevada, to switch his vote in support
of the bill (NYT, 1993h:A3).
In a bid to tax the more affluent elderly, the House gave
Clinton their full support regarding his proposal to tax 85-
percent (up from 50-percent) of Social Security benefits for recip-
ients with incomes in excess of $32,000 for couples and $25,000
for individuals. The Senate approved the increase, but those
affected would be couples and individuals with incomes ex-
ceeding $40,000 and $32,000, respectively (CQ Weekly Report,
1993d:1637). The numbers changed again in the Joint Conference
Committee, which decided to apply the new tax rate to couples
and individuals with incomes in excess of $44,000 and $34,000,
respectively. Delayed implementation of this tax and the higher
income figures were made to capture the vote of Senator Dennis
DeConcini of Arizona, one of six Democrats who voted against
the Senate bill (NYT, 1993h:A3).
Where did all this leave Clinton's promise to restore fair-
ness? In the same murky waters as his other campaign promises.
Again Clinton did little to convert his promises of change into
policy, and what he did do was undone by Congress. Clinton
proposed to place most of the increased burden on the wealthy,
but his proposals ignored the restructuring of the tax code
throughout the 1980s. The changes made when Reagan first
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took office resulted in a net increase in the tax burden for all
income groups below $75,000, while those at the upper end of
the scale enjoyed reductions in their tax burden. Spending cuts
further impacted upon these regressive changes in the tax code.
Edsall (1984) reports that according to the Congressional Budget
Office, during his first two and half years in office, Reagan cut
domestic spending on human resources by $101.1 billion, with
$65.4 billion of those cuts coming from programs that provided
cash or in-kind benefits that went directly to families (205).
These changes were such that a household with an income of
less than $10,000 paid $95 more in net taxes between 1980 and
1984 and lost $1,340 in benefits between fiscal year 1982 and
1985. Households making more than $200,000 experienced a net
cut in taxes of $17,403 over the same period, with any household
of $80,000 or more losing only $490 in benefits (205-206).
Another shift in the tax structure took place with the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. In this case, all income groups experienced
savings on their tax returns; but, the wealthiest benefitted dis-
proportionately from these breaks (Phillips, 1993: 113). Overall,
from 1977 to 1989 the top quintile of income groups experienced
a 5.8-percent decline in their federal taxes (the top 1-percent
of all families experienced a 24.7-percent decrease) while the
bottom two quintiles have experienced increases in their taxes
(112). Clearly, even Clinton's early proposals were modest in
light of the 1980's tax restructuring.
Reducing the Deficit
The last major theme of Clinton's campaign and plan for
restoring the economy centered around reducing the massive
Reagan/Bush deficit which developed from 1980-1992. When
Reagan took office, the debt was $1 trillion and when Bush left
office it was $4.6 trillion. During this period, the amount the
government owed per every $100 of the nation's income rose
from $26 to $53 (Friedmann, 1993). Clinton was critical of the
growing deficit during his campaign, and he pledged to reduce
the deficit by half during his term. This reduction was to take
place through a combination of tax increases and spending cuts.
Table 2 reports the highlights of Clinton's Deficit Reduc-
tion plan. In Clinton's detailed budget proposal, he outlined a
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variety of spending cuts under the categories of defense cuts,
eliminating unnecessary programs, reducing subsidies and in-
creasing user fees, managing government for cost-effectiveness,
streamlining government, and controlling health care costs.
These cuts, which include increased revenues which have been
designated as spending cuts by the Administration, represent a
total of $13 billion in 1994 and a total of $217 billion from 1994
to 1998 in non-defense spending cuts. Combined with the $112
billion in discretionary Defense spending cuts and the reduction
in the Debt Service of $46 billion, this plan provided for $375
billion in total savings over four years.
As a total package, Clinton's proposals would have reduced
the deficit not by half as he promised, but by a little more than
a quarter. Again, like the Stimulus Package and the Investment
proposals, the deficit reduction plan experienced difficulties in
its adoption by Congress. Clinton indicated his willingness to
sell out early when he abandoned certain fees within the cate-
gory of eliminating subsidies and increased user fees (slated to
save $1.5 billion in 1994 and nearly $27 billion through 1998).
For example, under pressure from various interest groups, the
proposed fees for mining, grazing, and timber were deleted.
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbit was able to get grazing fees
restored to satisfy environmentalists, however, when Clinton
needed Montana Senator Max Baucus's vote for NAFTA, the
fees for grazing on Federal lands were reduced. Furthermore,
many of the programs Clinton targeted for cuts have been
traditional pork barrel programs supported by Congress, which
historically have been placed under the deficit reduction axe
only to wiggle out again.
Clinton's proposed budget for the Central Intelligence
Agency is another example of his failure to implement signif-
icant changes. The Cold War is over, yet Clinton proposed to
fund the CIA at nearly $30 billion, up from $27 billion (NYT,
1993e:A7). In short, the CIA budget increased despite the fact
that the CIA does not have to fight the "Evil Empire", nor does
it have a significant new mission consistent with the national
interest.
Even without the changes to the Deficit Reduction plan
made by the Joint Conference Committee (which called for more
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spending cuts and fewer tax increases), Clinton failed to deliver
a plan for deficit reduction that matched his campaign promises.
In fact, Clinton's budget proposal would not have reduced the
deficit any more than the proposal put forward by Bush in 1990. The
Congressional Budget Office reported that Bush's budget and
the spending caps agreed to in the 1990 Budget Enforcement
Act would have cut the deficit by $496 billion over five years
(Friedmann, 1993; NYT, 1993c:A8).
Overall, Clinton's self-proclaimed "mandate for change"
and the obvious electoral support for change was not realized in
fiscal policy. There is little in the federal budget which suggests
any major shift in public policy. When extended out to 1997,
the proposed budgets of Clinton and Bush (Budget of the United
States Government, FY1994 and FY1993 respectively) are nearly
identical. Clinton's total proposed spending during this period
would actually be three-tenths of a percent lower then that of
Bush, while total receipts (as a percentage of GDP) would only
increase by 1.5-percent over those proposed by Bush. Clinton's
fiscal policy represents "business as usual".
Discussion
Clinton claimed a mandate for change, but his fiscal policy
does not include many of his promised changes, and overall
it does not represent a significant change from the policy of
the Bush administration. Why the failure to carry forth the
mandate? Part of the fault is Clinton's. Part of the troubles
stem from a fractured Democratic party under the misguided
direction of the Democratic Leadership Council. Part of the
problem lies with the Republican Party. Part of the fault lies
with the influence-peddling in the U. S. Congress. Finally, and
most importantly, the major reason for the continuing gridlock
in Washington, D.C. is an evolving political system dominated
by corporate America.
Traditionally, the Republican party has been viewed as the
party of big business, while the Democratic party has been
viewed as representing smaller businesses, developers, and a
variety of nonbusiness "special interest" groups like organized
labor. This view, however, is thoroughly outdated. Analyses of
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who gives substantial money to political campaigns (Domhoff,
1990; Stern, 1988), who has the largest and best organized lob-
bying efforts (Lapham, 1993; Reagan, 1987), who controls major
Congressional Committees (Domhoff, 1990; Greider, 1992; Sher-
rill, 1990), who becomes the chief staff aides and appointments
of presidents (Greider, 1992; Judis, 1993a), and who controls
major Federal agencies like the Federal Reserve Board (Grei-
der, 1987) all reveal the overwhelming dominance of corporate
interests in both the Republican and Democratic party. While
not always united or ruled by a consensus, corporate America
dictates the shape of the federal budget and the distribution
of benefits (Bartlett and Steele, 1992; Domhoff, 1990; Dye, 1984;
Greider, 1992). This statement does not deny the importance of
class fractions among the economic elite, as there are often fierce
struggles within and among these segments. The important
point is that these groups are the real political players. Other
political interest groups and constituents are either ignored, or
placated by symbolic legislation which lacks any real power
to challenge and change the very policies most Americans are
concerned about.
In the United States, capitalism was reconstituted because
of internal and external threats that emerged during the 1970s.
International competition for market shares grew as world-wide
production created the classic problem of overproduction and
underconsumption. For example, Greider (1992) noted that 45
million cars could be manufactured world-wide annually, but
only 35 million could be purchased. Across different economic
sectors there has been a mad scramble to cut labor and other
production costs (Harrison and Bluestone, 1988), and competi-
tion for market shares has grown increasingly fierce (Business
Week, August 1993). The renewed trade talks with Western Eu-
rope and Japan have had less to do with "free trade" than they
have with protecting domestic and international firms which are
either based in the United States, or able to purchase political
influence through Washington K-Street lobbying and consulting
firms.
The formation of OPEC, rising energy costs, and the ensuing
inflation it produced served as a wake-up call for U. S. corpo-
rate interests, who suddenly found that they were dependent
on international events. The Tri-lateral Commission failed to
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develop rules for orderly international competition in a world
economy. As a result, the major task of governments controlled
by corporate interests has been to expropriate the wages and
resources of ordinary citizens both at home and abroad. In
the United States, minimum wages are exceptionally low; new
jobs are largely filled by temporary workers and full time jobs
have been and continue to be changed to part time; white-collar
employees have been and continue to be dismissed and occa-
sionally rehired as consultants; the social wage has been and
continues to be eroded; and young people have not been able
to advance their careers or standards of living at the same rate
or to the same degree as their parents. Corporations explain that
they cannot raise prices in a weak economy, and therefore, they
must cut employees and wages to maintain profits. Cutting jobs
in the 1990s has become as popular as takeovers and mergers
were in the 1980s. Gans (1993) notes that one of the fastest ways
to increase the price of a company's stock on Wall Street is to
announce the firing of workers. However, because of reduced
per capita consumption, economists worry that permanent job
loss will have a negative effect on an already weak economy
(NYT, 1993g:A1).
Aggressive and increased corporate dominance of U.S.
politics was a response to the political insurgency of the 1960s.
Beginning with the civil rights movement, the political insur-
gence of the 1960s generated significant challenges to gov-
ernment policy. Citizens were mobilized around a variety of
issues and demanded that government provide increased regu-
lation and protection (Fendrich, 1993; Domhoff, 1990; McAdam,
1982). There was a substantial increase in the type and volume
of federal regulations. However, as Domhoff wisely observed,
"People won, but the power structure did not lose" (Domhoff,
1990:276). Corporate executives and their aides descended on
Washington in their Lear jets. They bought academic talent and
established Think Tanks (Phillips, 1993). They created business
PACs and devised other creative ways to influence and change
regulatory mandates. They put Ronald Reagan in the White
House and bought enough influence in Congress to protect their
interests. Clinton's fiscal policy does not represent a significant
shift from these same interests.
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As a whole, Clinton's presidency has failed to carry forward
the "mandate for change". The Economic Stimulus package
was reduced to little more than a shadow of its early incar-
nation, the investment proposals were cut by more than half,
and the restoration of fairness and a "fair" deficit reduction
has not occurred. Clinton did not adequately address the press-
ing economic problems that are part of the hangover from
more than a decade of Reaganomics. Japan, for instance, had a
much larger stimulus package to rebuild its faltering economy
(NYT, 1993b:C2), and the Western European community was
also working on a comparatively larger stimulus package. Lib-
eral outsiders recognized that Clinton's stimulus package was
inadequate for the country's needs. Jesse Jackson (1993) warned
about the deepening job crisis and Clinton's mania for budget
cuts. Felix Rohatyn argued in favor of a $25 billion a year, 10
year public works program to provide an adequate stimulus to
the economy (Rowen, 1993:5).
What sounded good in Clinton's campaign, rather than be-
ing crystallized into sound and effective economic policy, will
remain a distant dream. His major changes and promises are
projected to be implemented only in the distant future, and the
tax proposals will hardly soak the rich. Over the next five years
they will recover only $241 billion, or 23-percent of the revenues
lost during the first five years of the Reagan Administration.
In fact, by applying the percent change in the Consumer Price
Index to Reagan's $749 billion cut every year from 1984 to 1997,
it shows that it would take an amazing $1.1 trillion in tax in-
creases during Clinton's first term to replace those lost revenues.
Although conservatives howled about the largest tax increase in
U.S. history, Clinton's proposed tax increases were really quite
modest compared to the outrageous tax cuts of Reaganomics.
His tax package essentially leaves Reagan's tax breaks for the
wealthy and corporations in place. As a Democrat, Clinton is
the strongest probusiness president in this century and his first
budget is "worthy" of former president Bush.
Because of the lack of any major fiscal policy shifts, we
are likely to witness continued economic stagnation. The ma-
jor problems of unemployment and the replacement of full
time year-round workers with permanent, temporary workers
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will lead to continued stagnation and structural unemployment.
Continued Defense cuts without retooling industries and jobs
will contribute to a sluggish economy. The harmful effects of
the NAFTA treaty on U. S. manufacturing jobs will surface long
before any conceivable gains. As we reported above there is
no stimulus package. Moreover, Clinton's modest investment
proposals were severely reduced and underfunded. Welfare re-
cipients, particularly women and children, are going to be worse
off as they are removed from the welfare rolls and pushed in
the so-called "no man's land" of part time, minimum wage jobs
with no benefits.
Because of a sluggish economy, tax revenues will fall short
of projections. The federal deficit is not likely to be reduced by
the margins expected without adequate revenues. More spend-
ing cuts will be required to maintain the same level of deficit
reduction, and if the past is any indication, social programs and
tax breaks for the working classes and the poor will be cut to
make up for the difference. In general, spending cuts are more
harmful to the economy than tax increases. The reason for this,
Paul Samuelson argues, is that spending cuts "go directly to the
jugular of the current employment, production and re-spending
stream" (Hilzenrath, 1993:8A). Allen Sinai, a managing director
for Lehman Brothers, notes that his forecasts assume that over
a two-year period a spending cut of $1 shrinks the economy by
$1.10; while a tax increase of $1 shrinks the economy by only
70 cents (Hilzenrath, 1993).
Informed voters are likely to remember Clinton as the
Neville Chamberlain of U. S. domestic policy. Despite being
in tune with American voters and offering campaign promises
with economic substance, Clinton can be considered the great
appeaser. The actions of Clinton and Congress in 1993 do not
signal a significant attempt to put the country on a sound eco-
nomic footing. In contrast to Roosevelt's or Johnson's initiatives
early in their administrations, Clinton's success was extremely
limited. Indeed, in the course of this research we may have
found Clinton's political epitaph:
No wonder Americans hate politics when, year in and year out,
they hear politicians make promises that won't come true because
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they don't even mean them-campaign fantasies that win elec-
tions but don't get nations moving again.
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